Arnhem was a resounding defeat for the British, but in human endurance terms, the stuff of legend. Press glamorisation at the time laid the basis for a ‘legend’ upheld by Allied historians for years. Exhaustive research of the few remaining documents covering German post-operational reports corroborated by numerous contemporary eye-witness accounts revealed a new perspective. This was how the battle appeared to the ordinary German soldier, from private to battalion commander level. Kershaw interviewed numerous participants throughout Germany.

The immediate post-war view that defeat at Arnhem was caused by Allied mistakes because Germany had already lost the war persisted for a very long time. Extensive research revealed a very different picture. Much vaunted SS panzer divisions ‘waiting’ for the British were only at 30% strength and possessed virtually no tanks. A scratch-built force of German sailors, airmen and reservists fighting as infantry checked the airborne landings. Model the supreme German commander did not flee panic-stricken from the Hotel Tafelberg in Arnhem as paratroopers landed. He was a cold dedicated professional, who had already saved German fronts from defeat and retreat five times before and did so again.

It is claimed the British Airborne Division was dropped too far from the Arnhem Bridge. Kershaw’s research of German unit locations suggests defeat may have occurred sooner if they had. The German view was that the British had been skilful in their selection of the drop zone to cloak their intention and ought to have reinforced with another division in the same place. General Urquhart commanding the 1st British Airborne Division was often criticised as being too far forward in the battle, being cut off during a crucial phase. His German opposite, General Kussin, the town Commandant, was killed seeking the same fragmented information. His death resulted in a temporary paralysis of the defence of the Arnhem road bridge, enabling Lieutenant Colonel John Frost’s Second Parachute Battalion to capture it with ease.

That Arnhem was ‘A Bridge Too Far’ is the most famous myth exposed by this book. XXX Corps commanded by General Horrocks was reportedly just unable to reach it. An assessment of German troop locations following the capture of the Nijmegen Bridge reveals the remaining 14-kilometer stretch of road to Arnhem was virtually undefended and clear the following night. An opportunity to relive Frost barely holding onto the Arnhem Bridge was missed.

It Never Snows in September offers a number of revisionary perspectives to prevailing Arnhem myths. It recognizes the American contribution in keeping the ‘Airborne Corridor’ open despite the German discovery of the MARKET-GARDEN plan. The book reveals the plan was not recovered in its entirety; rather the Germans were never strong enough to exploit the windfall.

The ‘chivalric’ battle of Arnhem and Oosterbeek is reassessed in uncompromising terms. Excesses were committed by both sides. German casualties were more than twice previously claimed estimates. The British evacuation caught the Germans unawares, so impressed had they been by the ferocity of resistance, that they could not comprehend the British would abandon their bloodily won bridgehead. It took a further half-day of fruitless fighting against the remaining stragglers after the evacuation before the Germans appreciated their birds had flown the trap.

This book has necessitated a re-examination of some of the traditional views of the MARKET-GARDEN battles, which mainly project the allied view. ‘What about the Germans?’ allegedly remarked the commander of the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade when confronted with the Arnhem plan. It Never Snows in September offers just this perspective.